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Today, industrialization is taking place at the fastest rate in the history
of the state. If the state does not in fact need a comprehensive labor
relations statute, it is at least the duty of the legislature to make a
thorough study of the law governing labor disputes in Kentucky and
demonstrate that fact.
lames Park, Jr.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
After this note reached the printer's, the Supreme Court decided the case of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.. ........ U.S ......... , 77 S.Ct.
1166 (1957). This decision constitutes the latest statement by the Supreme Court
on the relation of picketing and the freedom of speech.
THE BROWN DECISIONS AND THE ADVISORY OPINION
According to a recent survey' made by the State Board of Educa-
tion, integration in Kentucky is proceeding in an orderly and reason-
able manner, indicating that there has been a good faith implementa-
tion of those constitutional principles set forth in the Brown decisions.2
The results of the survey show that integration has begun or a plan
of integration has been adopted in 108 of the 177 school districts
which contain Negroes of school age.3 These 108 districts contain
about 75 percent of the Negro population. Complete integration has
been effected in 18 to 20 percent of these districts.4 The report further
states,
As seen from the following tabulation of all local school
districts, there still remain about 69 districts with about 25 percent
of the Negro population that have taken no steps toward complying
with the decision. No doubt many of these districts had once thought
of following the informal'plan of integration when Negro pupils ap-
plied for entrance in formerly all white schools. This is not legal
procedure according to an opinion of the Attorney General. At the
close of the school year, two school terms will have passed since the
final decision and these school districts should proceed immediately
to move toward the adoption of a plan. In some districts this plan
may not be more than a simple order of the board of education while
in others it may require much study and preparation before the plan
is finally adopted by the board. The important thing to do now is to
take steps and proceed in good faith toward the building of a total
school service for all people of the district.5
Report on Integration, School Year 1956-57, published by the Department
of Education, Frankfort, Kentucky.2 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), designated herein as
the Brown decision; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), desig-
nated herein as the Brown decree.
3 Supra note 1 at page 2.
4 Id. at page 2.
I Id. at page 8.
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A. The Advisory Opinion
The "legal procedure" to which the survey refers is that set forth
in an advisory opinion" handed down by the Attorney General's office
on September 13, 1956 upon the request of the superintendent of
Webster County Schools where integration had begun at Clay. The
request arose from this sequence of events: Negro children had been
enrolled at Clay elementary school at the beginning of the school
term and had attended classes. Local white opposition arose as a
consequence of this integration and the situation became highly sensi-
tive. The National Guard was moved into the town to keep the peace
and escort the Negro children to and from school. A similar situation
had arisen shortly before at Sturgis where the National Guard was
already in use. The Webster County superintendent telephoned the
Attorney General's office for assistance in resolving the matter. This
resulted in the advisory opinion stating, in essence, that the Negro
children were illegally enrolled in the school until there had been some
action taken by the school board toward integration. On September
17, 1956 the Negro children at Clay were read an order by the
Webster County school board denying them admittance upon the
basis of the advisory opinion. Two days later, the superintendent at
Sturgis paralleled this action upon advice by the Attorney General
that the opinion was also applicable to that school.7
Of particular significance are two paragraphs of the opinion:
It is apparent that the Supreme Court desired to establish
an orderly process for accomplishing its purposes. It logically places
this responsibility upon the local agency in charge of the schools.
The corollary of this principle is that an individual parent has no right
to enroll his child in a school without some sort of action having been
taken by the school board. If he had such right, the orderly process
would be completely destroyed.
If the school board has failed in its responsibility under the Su-
preme Court decision, a parent or group of parents may make ap-
plication to a court having jurisdiction to compel action by the school
board. It is plain, however, as we say again, that action towards in-
tegration must be taken by the board itself, either voluntarily or upon
orders of a court, before integration begins.7a
6 See Appendix A.
7 There has been no success in attempts to clarify what would appear to be
a misapplication of the effect of the advisory opinion to the situation at Sturgis.
According to the Louisville Courier-Journal, Vol. 204, Number 76, page 1, Sep-
tember 14, 1956, the Union County Board of Education bad an official plan for
integration consisting of an order abolishing compulsory segregation with Negro
pupils having a choice of attending white or Negro schools. It was according to
this plan that the Negro pupils elected to attend the white school at Sturgis,
rather than the Negro school in Morganfield, twenty-two miles away. Since such
an order was sufficient to bestow upon the Negro a legal right to be in the Sturgis
school, it would seem that the Attorney General contradicts his opinion in saying
it is applicable to this situation.
Ya See Appendix A at page 693.
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B. The Right Given the Negro
Unlike the "immediate" and "personal" right given in State of Mis-
souri ex rel Gaines v. Canadas the right of the Kentucky Negro school
pupil, as construed in the advisory opinion, is one that arises only
after the school board has acted, voluntarily or under court order. It
is submitted that this is substantially what the Supreme Court meant
in saying that "school authorities" have "the primary responsibility"
and the duty of making only a "prompt and reasonable start"0 toward
complying with the integration decision. Postponement of the Negro's
admission by the authorities must be predicated, of course, upon the
existence of certain factors'0 which would make integration "im-
practicable". When it appears to the Negro that the school board has
not been acting promptly and reasonably to implement the integration
principle he may go into court to obtain a judicial review of the
school board's conduct. If the behavior of the school board in delay-
ing integration is not justifiable, the court may enter a decree enjoin-
ing further segregation, and recognize the Negro's right to immediate
admission. When the school board has voluntarily allowed immediate
enrollment of Negro pupils, no further action by any agency is needed.
When the school board has taken no action, or acted negatively,
further progress depends upon the institution of judicial proceedings
by or on behalf of the rejected Negro and thereafter progress depends
upon the judgment of the court which might either decree that in-
tegration begin at a specified time or permit indefinite delay. So the
maturation of any right given the Negro by the Brown decision (and
recognized by the Attorney General's opinion) involves action or in-
action by one or more of three agencies-the school board, the re-
jected Negro and the court.
Further evidence that the right to admission is not immediate is
forthcoming from the question of damages. Since the Negro has a
right to have the school authorities" make a prompt and reasonable
8305 U.S. 837 (1938).
9 Supra note 2, 349 U.S. at 800.10 Ibid.
"To that end, courts may consider problems related to administration,
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school
transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and at-
tendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of
local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the
foregoing problems."
"Ky. Rev. Stat. 160.160 (hereinafter known as KRS):
'Each school district shall be under the management and control of
a board of education consisting of five members, to be known as the
NoTs
start toward integration, then, in an action for damages against the
members of the school board for failure to make such a start, the
Negro should be entitled to an instruction that he could recover if
the defendants had failed to make a prompt and reasonable start. It is
highly unlikely, however, that a court would recognize this right to a
"prompt and reasonable" start and allow damages for its breach, nor
would a court allow an assessment of damages against the school
board at the same time that it enjoined segregation and specified a
date at which integration would commence.12 This conclusion is
'Board of Education of... Kentucky.' Each board of education shall
be a body politic and corporate with perpetual succession. It may
sue and be sued; make contracts; purchase, receive, hold and sell
property; issue its bonds to build and construct improvements; and
do all things necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it is
created."
Although Kentucky cases have held that the words "to sue and be sued" do not
embrace an action for tort committed by its officers and agents in performing a
public duty for which they receive no compensation or advantage, Wallace v.
Laurel County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W. 2d 915 (1941), these
officers and agents may be liable under the Civil Rights Acts, see note 10 infra
'For a consideration of the nature of the "right' given the Negro see (a) the
article, Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools, 65
Yale L.J. 630 at 632 (1956) and (b) Pomeroy, 4 Equity Jurisprudence, 935-6
5th ed. 1941).
a) The law journal article recognizes three possible interpretations of the
"right": (1) An immediate right to attend an integrated school, a denial of
which would give the Negro child an immediate action for damages
even though his right to admittance would be postponed in the man-
ner outlined by the Brown decree.
(2) An immediate right to have the local school board make a
prompt and reasonable start towards integration. The right would
mature only when suflfcient time had elapsed for the elimination of
the logistical factors listed in the Brown decree and the plaintiff
seeking damages would have to prove that the school board's delay
was unjustified.
(3) An immediate right to have the district court acting in a quasi-
administrative capacity generate the desegregation process with the
Negro child acquiring a right to the benefit of what has been ordered.
(b) Mr. Pomeroy writes,
In determining whether an injunction will be issued to protect any
right of property, to enforce any obligation, or to prevent any wrong,
there is one fundamental principle of the utmost importance which
furnishes the answer to any questions, the solution to any difficulties
which may arise. This principle is both affirmative and negative, and
the affirmative aspect of it should never be lost sight of, any more
than the negative side. The general principle may be stated as fol-
lows: Wherever a right exists or is created, by contract, by the owner-
ship of property or otherwise, cognizable by law, a violation of that
right will be prohibited, unless there are other considerations of policy
or expediency which forbid a resort to this prohibitive remedy. The
restraining power of equity extends, therefore, through the whole
range of rights and duties which are recognized by the law, and would
be applied to every case of intended violation, were it not for certain
reasons of expediency and policy which control and limit its exercise.
Should the right be one of immediate entry into a white school, and recognized
as such by the law courts, the plaintiff may have an action for damages (under
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reached because (1) if the Negro had to bring suit to protect his
interests, it is evident that public antipathy had prevented the school
board from acting voluntarily and the jury, drawn from that public,
would be wholeheartedly adverse to allowing the Negro damages,
and (2) should damages be given the Negro for the school board's
breach of duty in an area where public opposition is intense, such an
award may well result in pronounced action directed against the Negro
taking the form of economical and bodily persecution 3 and (8) in an
action by the Negro seeking an injunction and damages, the court
may consider the right to admission as the ultimate objective and
deny damages despite the fact that the Negro has been prevented
from obtaining an equal education for a year or more due to the
school board's failure to make a "prompt and reasonable" start.
If the court should decree an end to segregation either as of the
date of the decree or as of some specified future date, there would be
a clear recognition that any Negro rejected after the date specified in
the decree had an immediate right in the sense that he would be en-
titled to a judgment for damages against the defendant who rejected
him. And a decree approving a plan for gradual accomplishment of
integration would also be recognition that, at specified stages, any
Negro rejected in violation of the prescriptions of the plan would have
an immediate right in this sense.
As a consequence, both the right to have the school board make a
"prompt and reasonable" start toward desegregation and the right to
admission are not rights in the sense that they are remediable at law
in an action for damages. They stand as authority for the Negro's
petition for an injunction against segregation or for his suit requesting
that the school board make a "prompt and reasonable" start toward
integration.
C. Factors in Desegregation
The factors which militate against immediate desegregation fall
into two categories:
the Civil Bights Act, 42 U.S.C., secs. 1981 to 1986) (1952) yet be denied equitable
assistance in enforcing the right to admission by a court refusing to enter an in-junction against the local school board because of the existence of those problems
listed by the Brown decree, supra note 10. This is considered by Professor Gilliam
in his Comment on a Review, 45 Ky. L.J. 386 (1956-57).
If the right is not immediate but should be that right described in (a) (2),
it would not be cognizable at law until the school board has ordered integration
to begin or a court has handed down a decree ordering its initiation. Since the
right would arise from the decree, a damage action could arise only subsequent
to this decree.131nfra note 24. The trial court here has a delicate responsibility. On the
one hand, it has a duty to press for complete implementation of the righis declared
by the Brown decision. On the other hand, the interests of society as a whole
must be considered.
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(1) Logistical matters recognized by the Court 4 and
(2) Local antagonism, which the court did not mention.
If it is incumbent upon school authorities to make the primary step
toward integration, may their considerations of the problems which
face them properly encompass both of these categories? Does public
hostility fall into the category of "varied local school problems"15
whose solution is the responsibility of school authorities? The language
of the decree itself would seem to place the consideration of this
factor squarely upon the courts reviewing the actions of the school
authorities and not upon the school boards themselves.16 In Texas a
judge denied integration because the school board had not been able
to develop a plan.' 7 The decision was reversed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals"8 whose examination of the testimony in the lower court
indicated that community dissatisfaction was the real reason the school
board had made no effort to integrate. The court said,
We think it clear that, upon the plainest principles gov-
erning cases of this kind, the decision appealed from was wrong in
refusing to declare the constitutional rights of plaintiffs to have the
school board, acting promptly, and completely uninfluenced by private
and public opinion as to the desirability of desegregation in the com-
munity, proceed with deliberate speed consistent with administration
to abolish segregation in Mansfield's only high school and to put into
effect desegregation there.19
But there are statements which reflect the attitude of some courts who
believe that this element is one to be evaluated and included in the
thinking of the school boards. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Board" the court enjoined segregation in schools within the Orleans
Parish, but said,
The granting of a temporary injunction in this case does
not mean that the public schools in the Parish of Orleans would be
ordered completely desegregated overnight, or even in a year or more.
The Supreme Court, in ordering equitable relief in these cases, has
decreed that the varied local school problems be considered in each
case. The problems attendant desegregation in the deep South are
considerably more serious than generally appreciated in some sections
of our country. The problem of changing a people's mores, particularly
those with an emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly. 21
14 Supra note 10.
1 5 
"Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solu-
tion of varied local school problems.", supra note 2, 349 U.S. at 299.
16 "Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in
the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.", Id. at 300.
17 Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F. Supp. 936 (ND Texas, 1955).
18 Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F. 2d 93 (CA 5, 1956).
19 Id. at 96.
20 138 F. Supp. 337 (ED La., 1956).
21 Id. at 341; see Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. at 855, (ED Ark. 1956)
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In Prince Edward County in Virginia, an elected Board of Super-
visors controlled appropriations for white and negro schools. They
publicly declared that integration would mean closing all schools in
that no money would be allocated for the operation of integrated
schools. In Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County22
the district judge was called upon for final disposition of this case, one
of the original segregation cases before the Supreme Court in 1954.
The Negro plaintiffs had asked for a decree setting a time limit for an
order complying with the Supreme Court mandate in the Brown de-
cree. The motion was refused on grounds that integration would
mean closing the schools with the disadvantages of an interrupted
education for both white and colored pupils, risks of juvenile de-
linquency would be increased and school teachers would be deprived
of a means of income during the period the schools were closed. The
court felt that these results would be more undesirable than the
"social inferiority" inherent in segregated education. Here, local op-
position was buttressed by state legislation, legislation which, if its
validity is sustained, will nullify the efficacy of the Brown decree.
School boards have frequently assumed that local sentiment is to
be considered in deciding how and when integration shall be accom-
plished.23 This is also apparent in the reports of advisory committees
appointed to study integration.24
The language of the Brown decree reveals the Court's cognizance
of objections to integration arising from sociological beliefs but in-
dicates that desegregation should proceed despite such objections.2
where the court said, in speaking of problems which school authorities shall con-
sider.
"During the period of transition from a segregated to a non-segregated
system, the school authorities must exercise good faith. They must
consider the personal rights of all qualified persons to be admitted to
the free public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis. The public interest must be considered along with all the facts
and conditions prevalent in the school district ... "
22 149 F. Supp. 481 (ED Va. 1957); and see 4 Race Relations Law Re-
porter 780 (1956).
23 See Moore v. Board of Education of Harford County, 146 F. Supp.
91 at 93, 95 (DC Md. 1956); statement of the Chattanooga Board of Education,
3 "Race Relations Law Reporter 607 (1956) and the plan of integration of the
Hopkins County (Ky.) Board of Education, 5 Race Relations Law Reporter 966(1956); this plan was disapproved in Mitchell v. Pollock, 6 Race Relations Law
Reporter 1038 (1956).
24 See the Report of the Legal and Legislative Subcommittee of the Texas
Advisory Committee on Segregation in the Public Schools, 6 Race Relations Law
Reporter 1077 (1956).
25 "Courts of equity may properly take into acount the public interest in
the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it
should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional ,rinciples cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them,' Supra note 2,
349 U.S. at 300.
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Jackson v. Rawdon 8 is an instance of a court meeting this issue head-
on and may reflect the approach which the majority of courts will
take in denying to school boards the liberty of gauging public opinion
in formulating their plans of integration. The Supreme Court listed
those specific factors which equity courts could take into considera-
tion in allowing school authorities more time before integrating27 and
the element of public sentiment was absent from this list.
There is a manifest disadvantage in allowing school boards per-
mission to make their integration plans dependent upon the sub-
sidence of community opposition or in permitting this problem to be
included within the analysis of the school board. Any school board is
susceptible to public pressure and this vulnerability could encourage
instances of clothing resolutions to maintain segregation in the garb of
logistical problems that resist solution when the real reason for the
delay would be purely local opposition. This, in effect, would require
the courts to act in a quasi-administrative capacity leading to long
and involved inquiries into school system operation and create ad-
ditional delays in giving relief to the plaintiff. There is, on the other
hand, much to be said for permitting this local authority, whose
fingers are close to the pulse of the public, to weigh the advisability
of desegregating at a time when the Negro may gain his right to an
integrated education but would stand subject to the retributive
activities of the community. 28 When local antagonism rises to such
extreme degrees as to cause the school board to take no action what-
soever toward integration, the Negro may react in a similar manner
and decide that the risk involved in bringing a suit is not worth the
advantages of integration.2 9
D. Who Takes the Action: the Superintendent or the School Board?
The advisory opinion says that action determinative of the integra-
tion process must be taken by the school board, meaning that such
action must arise as a majority result of a group and negating the pos-
sibility that the integration plan may be initiated by the superintendent
or principal of the school. The inference is drawn that any Negro
child who was enrolled in school without school board sanction prior
26 Supra note 16.27 Supra note 10.
28See U.S. News and World Report 29-80 (Oct. 29, 1954).
29 The Negro may be reluctant to take advantage of his right to an in-
tegrated education or may be opposed to integration in general, at least this is the
conclusion reached by the Texas Advisory Committee (Supra note 20) on the
basis of a referendum vote which indicated that maintaining segregation was
heavily favored in those areas predominantly Negro, 6 Race Relations Law Re-
porter at 1081 (1956).
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to such enrollment was there illegally. The strength of this inference
is diluted by a second opinion delivered on September 28, 1956 which
modifies in part the language'of the first. White pupils had boycotted
integrated schools in Henderson County, Kentucky and, as a conse-
quence, the school superintendent asked the Attorney General four
questions, the first and second dealing with integration procedure:
1. Is the formal adoption of a plan necessary before a
district begins complying with the Supreme Court decision?
Answer: A formal adoption in the sense of a stereotyped pro-
cedure is not, we believe, contemplated as a necessity for compliance.
However, a school board, as we have pointed out in earlier opinions,
acts only through its duly authenticated minutes and, except in the
case of ratification as discussed in our answer to your second question,
it must take some action to begin desegregation . . . The excerpts
from the minutes of the Henderson County School Board meeting of
August 11, 1956, is adequate for the adoption of integration plans in
your school system, in our opinion.
2. May the superintendent, the executive officer of the board of
education, at the direction and agreement of the board and in keep-
ing with the policy of the board, either oral or written, proceed to
enroll pupils without regard to race?
Answer: The superintendent, being the executive officer of the
school board, can proceed to enroll pupils under the direction and
policy formulated by the school board. The correct procedure in this
regard would be for the school board to formulate the policy and
plans for enrollment of pupils and related matters in a properly called
meeting and have such plans spread upon the minute books of the
meeting, duly authenticated by the secretary or chairman of the board.
However, in the absence of this procedure, we can envision a situation
wherein the school board, after action by the superintendent, ratifies
that action. This could take place by formal ratification at a duly
called meeting or approval of related matters indicating a ratification
of the conduct of the superintendent.
The third question asked if the school board had a right to stop inte-
gration once it was started, and was answered in the negative by the
Attorney General. The fourth question dealt with conspiracy actions
being brought against individuals or organizations advocating viola-
tion of the school attendance laws. 0
Thus, the "action" of the school board referred to in the first
opinion is interpreted as
(1) a motion adopted by the school board to
(a) begin integration, or
(b) to initiate a plan of integration,
or
30 The boycott of Henderson County Schools was allegedly abetted by an
organization known as the "Citizens Council" who decided to pursue their aims
and objective through 'legal and legislative channels" after the second opinion
was delivered, Louisville Courier-Journal, Volume 204, Number 91, page 1,
September 29, 1956.
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(2) ratification of the superintendent's action of enrolling
Negro school children which was done without prior
school board sanction.
An extended discussion of what the Supreme Court meant when
it used the term "authorities" may be of doubtful utility. The language
of the decree says,
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities
have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems .... 31
It seems likely that a decision of such magnitude was not intended
to be subjected to the harassment of minute technicality; the court
may have been content to erect the skeleton and let the subsequent
case decisions supply the substance matter. As the word "authorities"
is one of all-embracing latitude, the court may have assumed that state
statutes would describe the roles of those persons in executive capaci-
ties whose functions are organic to the school system.
E. The Superintendent: Should He Act Alone?
Since the right given the Negro by the Brown decision is so com-
pletely foreign to the policy heretofore followed in segregated school
system operation, it is doubtful whether the school superintendent,
as chief executive of the school board, would have the sole authority
in making the integration move.3 2 His responsibilities and spheres of
policy-making have been prescribed through statute,33 local regulations
and powers acquired through custom under the "separate but equal"
theory and extension of those areas to include the prerogative to begin
desegregation would be totally dependent upon the delegation of
power he may have from the local school board or from state statute.
It is suggested that the school superintendent is a less desirable
source of authority from which the integration decision should come.
31 Supra note 2, 349 U.S. at 299.32 NVould the Negro who has been admitted by the superintendent and sub-
sequently expelled by the school board that had adopted no plan and did not
ratify the action of the superintendent have an action for damages? Not according
to the advisory opinion since the Negro was not legally enrolled. This is supported
in part by the decision in Steiner v. Simmons, Del. , 111 A. 2d 574(1955), where the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed a lower court holding
that the Negro children had a legal status quo existing prior to their expulsion.
The Supreme Court decided the case before the "procedural" Brown decree was
handed down. The reversal was based on the contention that the Supreme Court
had granted time to permit school officials an opportunity to work out a plan to
desegregate.
3 KRS 160.370 describes the superintendent as the executive agent of the
school board with the responsibility of carrying into effect the policies of the state
and local board. His general supervision of the schools is subject to the control
and approval of the school board.
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Vesting such authority in one man would result in a detriment or bene-
fit to the Negro according to the superintendent's personal predilec-
tions. If school boards should be susceptible to public opposition,
even more so the possibility that one individual could be swayed
with greater ease. Additionally, the action of the board, in prescribing
the commencement of integration, could overrule and nullify the efforts
of a superintendent who wished to delay integration, merely in defer-
ence to local opinion.
F. Summary
Since the advisory opinion warns the school boards that they must
comply with the good faith requirement of the Brown decree, it ap-
pears that there has been no extreme derogation of the Negro's right.
The Attorney General has interpreted it as one whose immediacy is
partially dependent upon the local school boards with ultimate
judicial review. This is consistent with the examinations of the courts.
To those who feel that there should be a rapid movement in destroying
the stigma of "second class citizenship," it seems unnecessary that the
Negro must bring suit to fulfill that which has been given him. But
there can be no dispute that the complexities of integration, discount-
ing the involved sociological objections, demand time-consuming proc-
esses of reconciliation. The Supreme Court has placed the burden on
the courts of first instance in seeing that the delay is necessitated by
the local factors.
There is little actual difference between the Brown decree and the
advisory opinion. The Attorney General has made more definite the
procedure by which integration is to begin in Kentucky school dis-
tricts with the stipulation that the school board, not the principal, must
make the decision. Although this was its legal effect, it was popularly
interpreted as a victory for the segregationists after the State had
demonstrated that military force would be used to prevent the jeop-
ardization of civil rights. The approbation of the opinion varied with
the personal evaluation of what the school superintendent at Clay had
'attempted and what the local opponents of desegregation accom-
plished.
In those areas in Kentucky where local opposition to integration is
present, the school boards have a delicate task in making integration
plans. The public and private considerations of taxpayer and pupil
must, however, be subordinated to the court's command. The school
boards' primary obligation now rests in the protection of the personal
interests of the Negro in admission to public schools as soon as it is
possible to do so.
Paul Saad
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APPENDIX A
September 13, 1956
Mr. Wilbur Collins
Superintendent, Webster County Schools
Dixon, Kentucky.
Dear Mr. Collins:
In our telephone conversations of yesterday and today, and in your
telegram of this date, you have described the official actions taken by
the Board of Education of Webster County to implement the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown vs. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L.Ed. 873, 38 A.L.R. (2d)
1180, and 349 U.S. 294, 99 L.Ed. 1083. The action of your Board has
been limited to the appointment of a committee of colored and white
citizens to study the proper procedure for desegregation in your
county. This committee was appointed last year but has not yet made
its report.
You now ask whether two Negro pupils who have presented them-
selves for enrollment at the school at Clay (heretofore attended solely
by white children) are entitled to enrollment without action by your
Board of Education. They have previously attended an independent
district school under a contract with the County Board.
The first opinion handed down on May 17, 1954, in the case of
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, supra, reversed the previous
line of opinions establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine, and
declared that the segregation of pupils in public schools on the sole
basis of racial origins was unconstitutional. That opinion, however,
reserved the matter of procedure in desegregation for further argu-
ment. The Supreme Court, among other questions, specifically asked
for argument on the following matters:
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates
the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children
should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segre-
gated systems to a system not based on color distinction?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based,
and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers
to the end described in question 4 (b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases:
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
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(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence
with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with
directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general
directions should the decrees of this Court include and what pro-
cedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?
The arguments were made, and the questions were finally de-
termined by the Supreme Court, in the second or "procedural" opinion
handed down in May of 1955. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the Court, chose to answer questions 4 (b) and 5 (d) in the affirma-
tive, thereby permitting "an effective gradual adjustment to be brought
about from existing segregated systems" and returning all of the five
cases to the courts of origin. It is to be noted in particular that, of the
five cases, the one involving the State of Delaware, came from the
Supreme Court of Delaware, which had held segregation unconstitu-
tional in that state. Despite the fact that the Delaware case was not
reversed, it was returned to the court of origin for further procedure
in line with the "gradualist" concept.
The Supreme Court made it plain that the defendant school boards
were required to make a prompt and reasonable start towards good
faith compliance with its ruling at the earliest practicable date. How-
ever, the Court said: "School authorities have the primary responsi-
bility for elucidating, assessing, and .solving these problems; courts
will have to consider whether the action of school authorities consti-
tutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional prin-
ciples.
The Board of Education of Webster County therefore has the pri-
mary responsibility for proceeding with integration at "deliberate
speed." It must assume this responsibility, for it does not take action,
or if it has not taken action with proper speed, any court having juris-
diction, state or federal, may require it to act upon proper application
being made to such court.
It is apparent that the Supreme Court desired to establish an
orderly process for accomplishing its purposes. It logically places this
responsibility upon the local agency in charge of the schools. The
corollary of this principle is that an individual parent has no right to
enroll his child in a school without some sort of action having been
taken by the school board. If he had such right, the orderly process
would be completely destroyed.
If the school board has failed in its responsibility under the Supreme
Court decision, a parent or group of parents may make application to
a court having jurisdiction to compel action by the school board. It is
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plain, however, as we say again, that action towards integration must
be taken by the board itself, either voluntarily or upon orders of a
court, before integration begins.
The only case which has arisen in Kentucky since the Supreme
Court decision is Willis vs. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177. In that case the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
recognizes the principles which we have just set out. Upon application
of a group of Negro parents, and upon the basis of facts set out con-
cerning the school system in the particular county involved, the Court
ordered the integration of the high schools of Adair County in Feb-
ruary, 1956, and the integration of the grade schools of that county in
August or September, 1956. This case, and the cases in other states
which we have examined, indicate very strongly that the courts will
require a rather speedy compliance in most areas of Kentucky. It may
be that when this matter is taken to court, if it is, the court will find
that Webster County has not acted with the "deliberate speed" re-
quired by the Supreme Court. It seems to us that good faith com-
pliance is more likely to be attributed to a school system which has
come up with a definite plan, though gradual in its nature, than to a
school system which has not adopted any plan at all.
This opinion has been written by the undersigned in collaboration
with Assistant Attorneys General M. B. Holifield, Robert L. Matthews,
Jr., and David Sebree.
Yours truly,
Jo M. Fergnson
Attorney General
JMF:ch
cc: Dr. Robert R. Martin
Superintendent of Public Instruction
